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BEYOND BLOOD QUANTUM
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING TRIBAL
ENROLLMENT
Tommy Miller

∗

INTRODUCTION
Tribal nations take many different approaches to citizenship. Many tribes
require their members to have a certain blood percentage, or blood quantum.
Some require that blood quantum match the specific tribe, 1 while others simply
require a blood quantum of Indian descent. 2 Membership determinations in other
tribes is based on lineal descent, 3 or matrilineal or patrilineal descent. 4 However,
membership in a tribe does not by itself ensure full and equal rights. In the
Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, for example, there are no blood quantum
requirements for membership, but the Chief, Assistant Chief, and Members of the
Tribal Council must be at least one-quarter Choctaw. 5 History provides a unique
lens through which to view the rise and current use of blood quantum
requirements for tribal membership.
Blood quantum laws were first used in the United States to prevent mixed
race people from holding public office or intermarrying with Europeans. 6 In 1817,
the federal government began using blood quantum in treaties to separate “half∗

* Tommy Miller is a 2015 J.D. Candidate at Harvard Law School and a member of the Colville
Confederated Tribes. He would like to thank his family for their constant support and inspiration,
Professor Joe Singer for his guidance, and the staff of the American Indian Law Journal for their
hard work.
1
See, e.g., HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE CONST. ART. IV (2012)
2
See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES, ART. II; See also
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on Indian
Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1123, 1139-45 (1994).
3
See, e.g., CHOCTAW NATION CONST., ART. VI, § 2 (1838) available at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/choctaw-msldigital/assets/325/1838constitution_original.pdf.
4
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54 (1978).
5
See, e.g., CHOCTAW NATION CONST., ART. VI, VII.
6
Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV.
1, 5.
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breeds” from those with a lower blood quantum, conferring benefits only on the
former. 7 These early treaties did not speak of blood quantum in terms of tribal
membership, but rather as a criterion to determine eligibility for specific benefits. 8
At least as early as 1847, however, treaties reflected that people of mixed blood
were members of the Indian tribes the government was dealing with. 9 Through
much of its history, however, the United States used a rule of patrilineal descent to
describe who it would recognize as Indian, 10 with a gradual shift to deference to
tribal definitions of membership. 11
Blood quantum started to become more relevant during the Allotment Era.
During that era the federal government’s goal was to dissolve reservations and
apportion the reservation lands among tribal members in the form of
“allotments”. 12 As part of the guardian-ward responsibilities the United States
believed it had with Indians, it placed restrictions on alienation of the allotments it
created from reservation lands. 13 The restriction was originally to last for 25 years
from the granting of the allotment. When that failed to free up the land quickly
enough, Congress passed a statute allowing Indians that were deemed
“competent” by federal officials to sell their parcels immediately. 14 To expedite the
allotment and division process, Congress began to use blood quantum and race
as proxies for competency, particularly for the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma. 15
At one end of the spectrum were whites and freedmen who had been incorporated
into the tribe, referred to as “Indians who are not of Indian blood,”16 and at the
other were full blood Indians. 17 The less Indian blood an individual possessed, the
sooner he could alienate his interests in the land, and the fewer restrictions he was
under generally. 18
As tribes gained autonomy, many included blood quantum as a prerequisite
for membership. Under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, many tribes
7

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
9
Id. at 12; TREATY WITH THE CHIPPEWA ART. 4, Aug. 2, 1847, 9 Stat. 904, 905.
10
See generally Spruhan, supra, note 6.
11
Id. at 29-30.
12
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (2012).
13
See General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, 389, ch. 119, 25 USCA 331
(1887) [hereinafter Dawes Act]; See also, Spruhan, supra note 6, at 40.
14
Act of May 8, 1906, 34 Stat. 182, 183, ch. 2348 (1906); Spruhan, supra note 6, at 40.
15
Spruhan, supra note 6, at 40-41.
16
See Act of Apr. 21, 1904, 33 Stat. 189, 204, ch. 1402 (1904); Spruhan, supra note 6, at 41.
17
Spruhan, supra note 6, at 41.
18
Id.
8
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adopted constitutions that included blood quantum at the urging of the Department
of the Interior. 19 Elimination of these blood quantum requirements would require
approval by the Secretary of the Interior. 20 However, the Department itself has
advocated for the removal of this review requirement, on the grounds that it
violates tribal self determination. 21 Additionally, many tribal constitutions also
contain express provisions that require federal approval before they can change
membership criteria. 22 Despite the formal support of the Department for selfdetermination, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) seems to remain hostile to the
idea of opening up membership. 23 Accordingly, some of the potential changes to
membership requirements presented by this article may be difficult to implement,
even with strong tribal support. Since 1975, tribes have moved towards selfdetermination. Part of this movement has been the revision of constitutions drafted
by the federal government, to bring them in line with the values, traditions, and
goals of the tribe. 24 One of the major stumbling blocks in this process of
constitutional reform is how the tribe will define its membership. 25 Above all, tribes
must design membership, and other institutions to reflect their unique tribal culture.
This paper seeks to facilitate the reform process by laying out some of the legal
and policy implications of various kinds of citizenship criteria, to add to legal and
tribal conversations about reform. Section I explores the legality of tribes
incorporating non-Indians as members; Section II examines the legal effects of
non-Indian enrollment in various areas of Federal Indian Law; and Section III looks
at the policy implications of adopting different kinds of membership criteria.
II. THE LEGALITY OF TRIBES ENROLLING NON-INDIANS AS TRIBAL MEMBERS

19

Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian Nations, 50 U.
KAN. L. REV. 437, 446-447 (2002).
20
Kirsty Gover, Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent
Rules in Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243, 255-57 (2009).
21
S. Rep. No. 100-577 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3925 (comments of Ross Swimmer,
Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior).
22
See, e.g., CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION CONST.,
art. II, § 3 (“Future membership may be regulated from time to time by ordinance of the
Confederated Tribes subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior.”) available at
http://www.cskt.org/gov/docs/cskt_constitutionbylaws.pdf, (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
23
See Goldberg, supra, note 19, at 448-449 (citing Thomas v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 2d
1185, 1192 (W.D. Wis. 2001)).
24
See AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS, 2 (Eric
Lamont ed., 2006).
25
See Goldberg, supra, note 19 at 437.
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In order for tribes to create membership criteria that are independent of blood
quantum it must be constitutional for tribes to include non-Indians as members,
and it must be within tribal inherent authority to recognize the non-Indians as such.
While there seem to be no cases directly testing either proposition, it seems from
the weight of the authority that it would be both constitutional and within the
inherent powers of tribes to adopt non-Indians as members.
A. The Constitutionality of Non-Members Being Tribal Members
It is likely constitutional for tribes to enroll non-Indians as tribal members.
Although some old Supreme Court cases suggest that there is an Indian lineage
requirement for tribal enrollment, the principles of Indian law and historical practice
indicate the opposite. Constitutional federal authority over Indian affairs derives
from the commerce clause, the treaty clause, and the necessary and proper
clause. 26 These clauses have been interpreted broadly to give the federal
government “plenary” authority over Indian affairs. 27 Historically, Congress and the
Executive branch have had primary authority in recognizing Indians and Indian
Tribes, with the Supreme Court giving deference to the decisions of the other
branches. 28 After the Civil War, the political branches forced some tribes that
previously held slaves to adopt the former slaves as tribal members. 29 Although
there have not been any Supreme Court challenges to this scheme of non-Indian
tribal membership, the longstanding historical practice and broad deference given
to the political branches mean that this scheme is likely constitutional. 30 The
following cases suggest the opposite, but only in unpersuasive dicta.
In United States v. Rogers, the Supreme Court decided that a White man
who had been adopted by the Cherokee Tribe was not subject to an exemption to

26

COHEN, supra note 12, at § 5.01.
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
28
See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913) (quoting United States v. Holliday,
70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865)) (“In reference to all matters of this kind, it is the rule of this court to follow
the action of the executive and other political departments of the government, whose more special
duty it is to determine such affairs. If by them Indians are recognized as a tribe, this court must do
the same.”).
29
See, e.g., Treaty with the Seminole Nation, 1866, art. 2, 14 Stat. 756; Treaty with the Cherokee,
1866, art. 9, 14 Stat. 799.
30
Several Supreme Court cases rely on historical practice to determine the validity of federal
action. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Thus, the longstanding
recognition of these non-Indian “freedmen” as tribal members would likely influence a decision
about the validity of that enrollment scheme.
27
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federal criminal jurisdiction that applied only to “Indian[s].”31 Rogers was a White
man who had been moved to Cherokee country, made his home there, married a
Cherokee woman, had several children, and had no “intention of returning to the
United States.” 32 Furthermore, the Cherokee Tribe had adopted Rogers, and
treated him as a Cherokee, with the full privileges of membership. 33 In order to
combat lawlessness, Congress had extended federal criminal jurisdiction over
Indian Country, but left an exemption for “crimes committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian,” over which tribes retained exclusive
jurisdiction. 34 The Court in Rogers wrote that “a white man who at mature age is
adopted in an Indian tribe does not thereby become an Indian, and was not
intended to be embraced in the exception above mentioned.”35Although this
language appears strong, the holding itself is simply that Rogers remains subject
to federal jurisdiction; his adoption was not enough to sever his ties and
responsibilities to the United States. 36 Additionally, the Court, interpreting
Congress’ intent, wrote that the exception “does not speak of members of a tribe,
but of the race generally,-of the family of Indians,” in an effort to preserve intraand inter-tribal autonomy over Indians. 37 The Court read the racial requirement
into the statute based on presumptive congressional intent regarding crime in
Indian Country. 38 There is no indication that tribes lack the general ability to
naturalize non-Indians, or make them members of tribes, just that tribes lack the
specific power to bring non-Indians under the exception to criminal jurisdiction,
because “Indian” in that statute is a purely racial term.
In Montoya v. United States, the court held that Victoria’s Band, which had
attacked settlers, constituted a distinct band that was not in amity with the United
States, and therefore the settlers were not entitled to remuneration under a federal
statute. 39 The Court defined an Indian tribe as “a body of Indians of the same or a
similar race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and
31

United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
Id. at 568.
33
Id. at 568.
34
Id. at 572.
35
Id. at 572-73.
36
Id. at 573-74.
37
Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573 (“[the exception] intended to leave them both, as regarded their own
tribe, and other tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages and customs.”)
38
Id. at 573 (The court’s reasoning also relies on the fact that it would be against congressional
intent to extend the exception to Rogers, as that would invite the criminally inclined to settle among
the Indians, and would frustrate Congress’ goal of preserving peace.)
39
Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
32
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inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory” and a “band” as “a
company of Indians not necessarily, though often, of the same race or tribe, but
united under the same leadership in a common design.”40 It also says that “tribe”
implies a separate racial origin. 41 The Court’s purpose in creating this definition,
however, was not to limit the definition of a tribe to members of the same race, but
to distinguish a band from a tribe for the purposes of designating a specific band
as distinct from the tribes to which its members were racially linked. Any
requirement that tribes be composed of members of the same race was dicta. The
court offers absolutely no reasoning to support including ancestry as a prerequisite
to tribal membership. The only reasoning that could be inferred to support the
inclusion of the racial requirement is that the court believes Indians are too inferior
to organize on a permanent basis unless connected by race, 42 which is both racist
and inaccurate. As the racial requirement for tribal membership was not relevant to
the holding of the case, and unsupported by reasoning, it should not be
considered evidence that tribes lack the ability to adopt non-Indians.
Like Montoya, there is language in United States v. Sandoval to suggest
that race is a requirement for tribal membership. Sandoval involved the trafficking
of alcohol in Indian country, which was a federal crime. 43 The question was
whether Congress validly designated the Pueblo land as Indian Country, that is,
whether the Congress could validly consider the Pueblos to be Indians and govern
them with special laws. 44 The court held that as long as a community was distinctly
Indian, Congress could deal with them as a tribe for as long as it wanted, which
included the Pueblo. 45 Although Congress could not arbitrarily assert that a group
of people were “Indians” for the purpose of governing them separately, the
designation was not arbitrary for the Pueblo, considering their “Indian lineage,
isolated and communal life, primitive customs and limited civilization.” 46 Although
this list was sufficient to justify congressional action in that case, there is no
indication that all, or even any, of the factors on the list are necessary to recognize
a group as a tribe. In other words, the court does not hold that Indian lineage is a
40

Id. at 266.
Id. at 266.
42
See Id. at 265 (discussing the aspects of Indians’ characters that make it impossible for them to
form a true “nation”). See also Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and tribal
Sovereignty, 87 W ASH. L. REV. 1041, 1072-1073 (2012) (providing a historical context for the
court’s rhetoric).
43
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 36 (1913).
44
See Id. at 38.
45
See Id. at 46-49.
46
See Id. at 46-47.
41
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constitutional requirement for federal recognition of a tribe, or those tribes would
be unable to enroll non-Indians.
A central theme in the dicta of these cases is the association of “Indian”
status with race. These cases were the products of a different era in United States
history, however, and conceptions of race and the appropriate role it should play in
legal decisions has changed dramatically. In the area of Federal Indian Law in
particular, the Supreme Court has determined that “Indian” is a political term,
rather than a racial one. 47 Accordingly, the race-based reasoning of these cases is
no longer valid. Although there remains a descent component, 48 current federal
recognition requirements emphasize political existence of tribes. 49 Additionally, the
descent aspect is not explicitly racial, but requires members of a tribe seeking
recognition to “descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes
which combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity.” 50 To the
extent that this regulation attempts to place a limitation based on race rather than
political affiliation on tribal membership, it would likely trigger equal protection
concerns explored in Section II of this paper.
Overall, the enrollment of non-Indians in tribes is likely constitutional, and is
supported by historical actions of both tribes and the political branches of the
federal government.
B. The Inherent Ability of Tribes to Adopt Non-Indians as Members
It is an established principle of Indian law that Indian tribes possess
“inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.” 51 A
corollary of this principle is that tribes retain all of their sovereign powers except
those “withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status.” 52 Indian tribes likely possess the ability to recognize
someone as a tribal member for the purposes of granting them rights and

47

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (f) (2014).
49
See, e.g., Id at (b) (the group must comprise a distinct community that traces its roots to
historical times); Id at (c) (The group has maintained political control over its members since
historical times).
50
25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (e) (2014).
51
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1978). See also COHEN, supra note 12, at §
4.01[1][a].
52
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). See also COHEN, supra note 12, at § 4.01[1][a].
48
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privileges of citizenship, 53 but whether or not they may be recognized for more
general purposes, such as receiving federal benefits, is less clear. 54 The ability of
tribes to control their membership has been recognized as an important element of
tribal sovereignty. 55 Therefore, tribes likely still retain the ability to recognize nonIndians as tribal members.
It is unlikely that tribes have been implicitly divested of the power to enroll
non-Indians. The Supreme Court first articulated the principle of implicit divestiture
in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 56 There, the Court noted that tribes had
already lost the ability to freely alienate their lands and form political connections
with foreign powers. 57 Post-Oliphant, the implicit divestiture doctrine has been
applied to other forms of jurisdiction as well, 58 although the rationale behind the
theory is unclear. 59 Oliphant itself seems to suggest that tribal powers are only
implicitly divested when they come into conflict with the interests of the United
States, which has “overriding sovereignty.” 60 In Montana v. United States,
however, the Court held that tribes lost the power to regulate non-member hunting
and fishing activity on reservations not because it conflicted with federal authority
or interests, but because tribes had lost that power as a result of their “dependent”
status. 61 The Supreme Court has not yet directly decided whether tribes can enroll
non-Indians as members for general purposes such as receiving federal benefits,
although the principles of implicit divestiture and federal Indian law generally
suggest that tribes have not been divested of this power. 62
Tribal enrollment of non-Indians does not seem overly in conflict with the
interests of the United States. Unlike in Oliphant, where the federal government
53

See Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897).
See infra Section II. (a discussion of potential treatment of non-Indian tribal members under
various areas of law.)
55
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
56
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
57
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (citing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21
U.S. 543 (1823) and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)).
58
See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
59
COHEN, supra note 12, at § 4.02[3][a].
60
Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 at 209.
61
See Montana, 450 U.S. 544 at 564; See also COHEN, supra note 12, at § 4.02[3][a].
62
See infra Section III. (Status as a tribal member or an Indian is used in different ways in different
areas of federal statutory and common law, and the inability to adopt non-Indians for one purpose
does not foreclose adoption for another purpose). United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
(Tribes cannot exempt non-Indians from federal jurisdiction by enrolling them as members under a
particular statute, but that does not mean that Indian tribes are similarly limited in other areas).
54
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had legislated in the area of criminal jurisdiction and therefore expressed its
interests clearly, 63 Congress has made no indication that tribes should not be
enrolling non-Indians. Indeed, to the contrary, Congress and the President have
demanded that certain tribes enroll non-Indian former slaves as members. 64 On
the other hand, massive increases in tribal membership would increase the burden
on the federal government to provide certain services, like healthcare, to Indians.
Since these programs are generally underfunded, it is not clear that the addition of
more tribal members would by itself result in any actual increased financial or
other burden for the federal government. If the “overriding interests” version of the
implicit divestiture test is applied to determine the scope of the tribal power, it
seems like the tribe will be held to have the power. Later sections of this paper
address some of these concerns.
It is also unlikely that this power to expand membership has been lost as a
result of the status of tribes as a result of their dependent status. In Roff v. Burney,
the Supreme Court recognized the broad power of tribes to control their
membership decisions, including with regards to non-Indians. 65 Indeed, in
Montana the court recognized a difference between powers necessary to selfgovernment and internal relations and decisions affecting outside groups, and
specifically reaffirmed tribal control over membership determinations. 66 Once
again, the ability to enroll tribal members who would then receive federal benefits
is unclear, but the enrollment of non-Indians would only directly increase the
number of people vying for a piece of the existing pie, and would not force the
federal government to increase appropriations. Accordingly, because there is no
conflict between tribal and federal interests, tribes likely have not lost the power to
expand membership as a result of their dependent status.
II. LEGAL IMPACTS OF ENROLLING NON-INDIANS
Non-Indians enrolling as tribal members would have implications for many
areas of federal Indian law, and would change the constitutional legal analysis for
some established legal doctrines. In the following examination, I will assume that
the adoption law that is followed would allow non-Indians to become full tribal
63

Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 at 203.
See supra Section I.A.
65
Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897). (The disenrollment of a White man was acceptable, but did
not rule directly on the acceptability of his original adoption.)
66
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981), (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 322 n. 18 (1978)).
64
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members, as opposed to tiered membership as discussed in Section III. The court
in Morton v. Mancari held that distinctions based on status as an Indian were
“political” rather than “racial” distinctions, 67 so anything less than full tribal
citizenship might be considered another level of political classification, and may
not trigger the equal protection analysis that I describe for certain laws. Parts A, B,
and C will examine the impact of non-Indian enrollment on federal, tribal, and state
criminal jurisdiction, respectively. Parts D and E will examine the minor effect on
tribal and state civil jurisdiction, while Part F will explore the impact on federal
statutory benefits.
A. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country is governed by the General
Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act. 68 The General Crimes Act applies only to
interracial crimes between Indians and non-Indians within Indian Country, 69 while
the Major Crimes Act applies to any “major” crimes committed by Indians in Indian
Country. 70
In order to count as “Indian” for the purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction,
a defendant must be shown to have some degree of Indian blood, and be
recognized as Indian by a federally recognized tribe, although this does not always
require membership in the tribe. 71 The requirement of “some Indian blood” 72
comes from the case United States v. Rogers, in which a White man adopted by
the Cherokee was held to not be an Indian for the purposes of federal criminal
jurisdiction. 73 That case involved the Indian-against-Indian exception to the
General Crimes Act, and held that Rogers was not subject to the exemption
67

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 9.02.
69
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2014). Cohen, supra note 12, at § 9.02[1]. (Indian-on-Indian crime is
exempted from the General Crimes Act by the statute itself, and the Supreme Court has held that
non-Indian-on-non-Indian crime within Indian Country is subject to state jurisdiction). United States
v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
70
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2014).
71
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, § 9.02[1][d].
72
See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 W ASH. L.
REV. 1041, 1086-87 (2012). The Supreme Court has never stated how much Indian blood is
required, and lower courts have come to various conclusions. Id. Courts have adopted amorphous
requirements ranging from “some” to “substantial.” Id. Because the amount of Indian blood required
does not affect the equal protection analysis, this paper will use the “some” standard when referring
to the requirement.
73
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
68
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because he was White. 74 This case, however, was decided before the ratification
of the 14th Amendment and the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence,
and this rule may no longer be good law. Now, the requirement of “some Indian
blood” could be an impermissible racial classification foreclosed by Morton v.
Mancari. 75
After Morton, federal laws targeting Indians are generally understood as
being political, rather than racial classifications, and are therefore not subject to
the strict scrutiny applied to classifications based on race. 76 However, tribal
members are still subject to the protections of the 14th Amendment, such as
protections from racial discrimination. 77 Therefore, if non-Indians could be enrolled
as members, the blood requirements for both the General Crimes Act and the
Major Crimes Act would be suspect, because they would create different
outcomes based solely on race. For instance, under the General Crimes Act, a
non-Indian tribal member defendant who committed a crime against an Indian in
Indian Country (e.g. Rogers) could argue that he should be subject to the
exemption for Indian-on-Indian crime, and not be subject to federal prosecution.
Since a similarly situated person of Indian descent would be exempt, and the only
difference is his ancestry, this is a compelling claim.
Additionally, the requirement of Indian blood in the Major Crimes Act could
be challenged by an Indian prosecuted in federal court under the act. In United
States v. Antelope, the Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge brought by a
Coeur D’Alene tribal member who argued that his federal prosecution violated
equal protection because it subjected him to the federal felony murder rule, while a
non-Indian would have been subject to Idaho law, which had rejected the felony
murder rule. 78 The court held that the distinction was based on the tribal
member’s political affiliation with a federally recognized tribe, rather than a racial
distinction, and was therefore constitutional. 79 The court did not address the fact
that a similarly situated non-Indian tribal member would presumably have been

74

Id.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535.
76
Id. But see COHEN, supra note 12, at § 14.03[2][b] (arguing that Morton is about fulfilling the
“unique obligations toward the Indians,” rather than a political/racial distinction).
77
See, e.g., Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty AbuseWisconsin, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1385 (W.D. Wis. 1992); COHEN, supra note 12, at § 14.
78
United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
79
430 U.S. at 645.
75
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exempt from federal prosecution, simply by virtue of his ancestry. Had this issue
been considered, the court might have found an equal protection violation.
An equal protection challenge framed in either of these ways would likely
result in the end of the “some Indian blood” requirement. The requirement does
not appear on the face of either statute, and was added as a gloss on the General
Crimes Act by the court in Rogers, based on presumed congressional intent. 80
Since Rogers was before the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, the
court did not have to deal with the equal protection clause in construing
congressional intent. Under the modern constitutional avoidance canon, this
requirement would raise a constitutional question; a reasonable interpretation that
avoids the question should be adopted before the constitutionality question is even
reached. 81 The Major Crimes Act was first passed in 1885, 82 after the ratification of
the 14th Amendment, so it should be easy for the court to say that the blood
requirement does not apply to that Act, unless there is overwhelming evidence of
congressional intent to the contrary. The General Crimes Act, however, is
somewhat more complicated. The current statute was passed in 1948, 83 but the
law itself has not been substantively changed since 1854, 84 before the passage of
the 14th Amendment in 1868. Additionally, the relevant parts of the law (the
exceptions to federal jurisdiction) are the same as they were in Rogers, when the
gloss was added. The Court could therefore presume that congress intended the
subsequent versions of the act to incorporate the requirement that the Court
added in Rogers. This presumption, however, likely does not rise to the level of
clear congressional intent required to overcome the constitutional avoidance
canon, and the word “Indian” in the statute would likely be interpreted to require
only tribal affiliation. As a result, it is likely that any non-Indians enrolled as tribal
members would be treated as “Indians” for the purpose of federal criminal
jurisdiction.
B. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
80

Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573.
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
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82 Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9, Stat. 362 (1885).
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83 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 6, 62 Stat. 683, 757 (1948).
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Tribes retain the inherent authority to prosecute tribal members in their
tribal courts. 85 Accordingly, non-Indians who become tribal members would be
automatically subject to tribal jurisdiction. Additionally, opening up tribal
membership to non-Indians would make it more likely that the Supreme Court
would uphold expansions of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-member
Indians, such as the Violence Against Women Act amendment, or the Duro fix.
The ability of non-member Indians to enroll in a tribe would increase the
likelihood that the Duro fix, subjecting non-member-Indians to tribal jurisdiction,
would survive judicial scrutiny. In Oliphant v. Suquamish, the Supreme Court held
that tribes lacked inherent jurisdiction over non-Indians. 86 In Duro v. Reina, the
Court extended this holding to say that tribes could not exercise jurisdiction over
non-member Indians. 87 In response, congress passed “Duro-fix” legislation, which
recognized the “inherent power” of tribes to prosecute non-member Indians. 88 This
recognition of tribal authority was upheld in Lara, a double jeopardy case where
the defendant was being tried in federal court for a crime that he had already been
convicted of in tribal court. 89 However, Lara’s challenge was narrowly constrained
to the issue of whether tribal prosecution was a delegation of federal power or
recognition of inherent tribal power, and whether the recognition of tribal power is
valid. 90 Importantly, Lara did not address the due process or equal protection
problems that might arise from prosecuting a non-member in tribal court. 91
Because the Court determined that those challenges related to the original tribal
conviction, and not this subsequent federal prosecution, those challenges were left
for another day. These are not frivolous challenges, as the court may not be
inclined to uphold a tribal prosecution of a non-member. Justice Kennedy, in
particular, who concurred with the result in Lara, was very concerned with
subjecting non-members to tribal jurisdiction. 92 Of the justices who remain on the
court, only Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg signed the majority opinion that
said congress could and did recognize the tribe’s inherent authority. Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas both expressed concerns about the power of congress even
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to delegate this authority, 93 and seem inclined to vote against further expansion of
tribal authority.
The constitutional basis for invalidating the Duro fix is unclear. In terms of
equal protection, the Duro fix is based on membership in a federally recognized
tribe, which seems to place Duro-esque prosecutions clearly on the political side of
the political, racial Mancari divide. As a result, equal protection claims are unlikely
to succeed. 94 For due process, Indian tribal courts are required to comply with the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), but ICRA does not encompass the same range of
protections as the Bill of Rights. Notably, the right to counsel for indigent
defendants is not present in ICRA. 95 This could lead to a successful due process
claim being brought against a tribal prosecution, although, since the tribe would be
prosecuting as a separate sovereign not subject to the Constitution, the real issue
might lie with Congress’ decision to recognize this tribal sovereign power at all.
The Violence Against Women Act amendment, which subjects non-Indians to
prosecution in tribal court in limited circumstances, does require tribes to provide
full constitutional protections to defendants, which should alleviate any due
process concerns, especially since those protections can be enforced in federal
court through a habeas petition. 96
Justice Kennedy suggests it is unconstitutional to subject non-members to
tribal prosecution; as such prosecutions violate the principle of consent of the
governed. 97 Professor Fletcher frames the unease that Justice Kennedy and some
scholars have with tribal court jurisdiction as a problem with “democratic deficit.”98
Under this theory, nonmembers should not be subject to tribal jurisdiction because
93

Id. at 216-17, 231 fn. 3 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring, and Souter, J. dissenting, which Scalia
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VIOLENCE AGAINST W OMEN REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013 (2013), available at
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simply renouncing their tribal citizenship; Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Because this does
mostly answer Kennedy’s concern with regard to non-member Indians, it seems like Kennedy’s real
concern might be with expansions of tribal criminal jurisdiction to non-Indians, who would have no
such means of escape. But see Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (Kennedy writing that
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(2011).
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they “cannot and could not ever have participated in the political processes that
created the tribal laws and regulations at issue.” 99 Regardless of the questionable
merit of this argument, 100 by expanding tribal membership and removing or
changing the blood quantum requirement, non-members and non-Indians would
find themselves able to eventually become tribal members and even if they did not
take advantage of that opportunity, the potential for participation would remove this
“democratic deficit.” The impact of opening up membership, then, would seem to
go beyond expanding jurisdiction to those that join the tribe, and make
constitutional the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a much larger portion of the
populace.
C. State Criminal Jurisdiction
Like its federal counterpart, state jurisdiction in Indian country usually
depends on the Indian status of the defendant. If both the defendant and the victim
are non-Indians then the state has jurisdiction. 101 Otherwise, in most cases, the
General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act preclude state prosecutions. 102
Because the same statutes apply, the same equal protection analysis from that
section also applies, and non-Indian tribal members would likely be treated the
same as Indian tribal members for the purposes of state criminal jurisdiction. 103 In
cases where the state has jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country by virtue of
Public Law 280, 104 or some other statute, the state would logically have the same
amount of jurisdiction over new tribal members as it had over tribal members
before, whatever that jurisdiction may be. 105
D. Tribal Civil Jurisdiction
99

Id.
This kind of argument is not given much force in other contexts. For instance, travelling to
another state subjects a citizen to the laws of that state, regardless of the lack of meaningful
opportunity to vote in the elections of that state unless the citizen changes residency. The real
motivation for this argument may then be a discomfort with Tribal justice systems generally, which
would still be somewhat alleviated by allowing non-members to potentially join.
101
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
102
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Like tribal criminal jurisdiction, allowing non-Indians to become members
would have a number of benefits for tribal communities. Tribes generally have
broad civil regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over members, 106 so new
members would be subject to that same authority. Additionally, there are two ways
allowing non-Indians to become members could potentially expand jurisdiction
even to non-Indians who do not become members.
First, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation suggests that by consolidating the ownership of land the tribe could regain
the ability to exclude from a majority of the land and therefore also exercise
greater jurisdiction over the whole area, particularly for zoning purposes. 107
However, Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley dramatically limited Brendale, such
that it only applies when the non-Indian fee land is “closed,” and development
would place the entire area in jeopardy. 108 As a result, this approach would be
unlikely to expand tribal jurisdiction greatly.
The second approach deals with the same “democratic deficit” problem that
exists for tribal criminal jurisdiction, 109 that is, the idea that non-members should
not be subject to tribal laws that they can never play a role in creating. For the
same reasons identified in Section II.B, by making it possible for non-Indians to
enroll in tribes, jurisdiction might theoretically extend to all those that could
potentially join the tribe, because they would no longer be necessarily excluded
from tribal decision-making. However, tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members is
currently governed by the Montana test and its exceptions. 110 Montana says that
tribes generally lack jurisdiction over non-member on non-member owned fee
lands within the reservation, except for those non-members who enter consensual
business relationships with the tribe or its members, or where such jurisdiction
would be necessary to protect “the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.” 111 Accordingly, merely opening up membership
would not be enough to expand jurisdiction to all non-member activities on a
reservation, although including more members would increase the sweep of the
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first Montana exception, as any activity that involves tribal members satisfies the
exception.
E. State Civil Jurisdiction
States generally have limited civil jurisdiction over Indians in Indian
Country, 112 and by enrolling in tribes, non-Indians would be able to avoid some
forms of state jurisdiction. In particular, some forms of taxation would likely be
barred by on-reservation non-Indians enrolling in a tribe. 113 Non-Indians who
enrolled would still have to pay ad valorem taxes on fee land they owned on the
reservation, 114 but they would likely be free from paying personal property
taxes. 115 Additionally, these new tribal members would not have to pay taxes for
activities or income earned on the reservation. 116 This would provide an incentive
for non-members to enroll in a tribe if they lived on the reservation.
F. Statutory Benefits
Most statutory benefits and services are based on membership in a
federally recognized tribe, instead of Indian ancestry. 117 Fletcher attributes this
deference to Indian membership determinations partially to the Supreme Court’s
race jurisprudence. 118 Some programs, like the Bureau of Indian Affairs
employment preference, used to require a certain blood quantum in addition to
112

COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at § 6.03[1][a].
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membership in a federally recognized tribe, but in the wake of Morton v. Mancari
those requirements have been dropped. 119 As a result, it appears that non-Indian
tribal members would be eligible for the full range of services that Indian tribal
members are eligible for, and they would be treated as Indian for other purposes
such as Indian Child Welfare Act protections. As discussed in Section III, however,
if tribes begin separating membership from rights, and creating tiered citizenship,
the federal government may rework its benefits criteria.
III. EVALUATING MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA
There are many alternatives available for expanding tribal enrollment, each
with its own costs and benefits. The ideal membership requirements will depend
on the tribe and tribal values at issue, but Professor Carole Goldberg presents a
useful framework for thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of various
alternative criteria for membership. 120 This paper emulates that approach by
beginning with the goals and considerations for tribal membership, and then
examining how various criteria and approaches meet those goals.
A. Goals and Considerations of Tribal Membership
In designing membership criteria, there are many factors that a tribe might
consider, based on the unique goals and circumstances of the tribe, to ensure its
long-term strength and survival.

1. Community Belonging
Creating a strong sense of community is clearly an important element of
tribal survival. Relying on blood quantum to determine membership can help
facilitate the natural community that comes with kinship. Additionally, Professor
Goldberg argues that enrollment criteria based on descent or blood are in-line with
119
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traditional means of determining membership in a tribe, since tribes have always
used kinship as a primary marker of who belongs to the group. 121. As a historical
matter, this seems accurate, and is an interesting counterpoint to the common
arguments that blood quantum should be discarded because of its “untraditional”
origins. 122 However, it seems like this was less the result of any conscious
decision to use blood quantum to determine membership, and more a
consequence of historical context. When people were less mobile and more
isolated generally, their genealogical roots were less diverse. Community
belonging, in the sense of mutual connection between an individual and the
community, is generally considered to be less about distant genetic roots and
more a sense of being born and raised in the same place, or otherwise having
close ties and relationships. Blood quantum, conversely, focuses on the most
distant genealogical roots possible, and ties membership to those roots. Different
tribes have different conceptions of descent and for some bloodlines may be
paramount in determining membership and role in society. For those tribes that do
not have longstanding traditions of this sort, it may be useful to examine the role of
blood quantum in shaping contemporary understandings of community belonging,
and question whether blood quantum and the related values are the most useful to
ensuring the strength and survival of the tribe.
2. Maintaining Cultural Cohesion
Cultural survival is one of the fundamental motivations of tribal
governments. Without the attributes that make a tribe unique, it is essentially just a
municipal government. In order to continue to exist as separate sovereigns, native
nations must preserve their cultural sovereignty. 123 A membership criterion that
takes cultural affinity into account will help support tribal survival by causing the
tribe to reflect on its cultural values, and by screening out those with weaker
cultural ties. Professor Goldberg notes that one of the issues with loosening
enrollment restrictions is the loss of cultural cohesion, and less of an emphasis on
cultural strength as a political goal for tribal leaders. 124 This framework assumes
that individuals with less blood quantum will have weaker cultural ties. As a
121
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general matter this is probably true, since lower blood quantum will mean more
generations of marriage with people outside of the tribe, and logically, more
influence from outside culture. On an individual basis, however, this is less true,
and there are frequently cases where members with lower blood quantum or nonmembers will be more engaged in the tribal community and culture than those with
a higher blood quantum. Thus, it might seem intuitively appealing to base tribal
enrollment on individual cultural connection, or proxies for that connection, such as
residency. There are several problems with cultural connection to determine
membership discussed below. 125
3. Maintaining Numbers
Blood quantum requirements combined with intermarriage rates suggests
that some tribes will see drastic reductions in tribal membership, and potentially
extinguishment of the tribe. 126 Loss of tribal identity is a serious problem,
particularly for smaller tribes. As a result, in order to maintain tribal populations or
existence, it may be necessary to adopt less stringent forms of enrollment criteria.
4. Ensuring that future generations can remain tribal members
It is likely painful for many tribal members to think that their children or
grandchildren might not be able to be members of their tribe. Rates of
intermarriage are high, and members might want to ensure that their descendants
are allowed to keep their tribal identity. 127 This is related to the issue of tribal
survival just discussed. 128 Balancing personal desires to continue Indian heritage
with the goals of the tribe and the goal of creating objective, universal rules for
membership will be a difficult but necessary task for tribal members. Some tribal
members might favor loose restrictions that would allow their children to become
members of the tribe, even if that level of restriction would not be good for the tribe
as a whole. These individual preferences could determine the success of a
constitutional reform effort, and should be carefully considered in designing
membership criteria.
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5. Increasing Political Power
By increasing tribal enrollment, tribes could theoretically increase their
political power at the state and federal levels by representing a larger voting bloc
and being able to mobilize more people for certain political goals. The Cherokee
are an example of this strategy in action. 129 There are some problems with this
plan, however. First, since Indians make up such a small percentage of the overall
population, for many tribes, even expanding membership to include all lineal
descendants would still not result in a very large voting bloc, relatively speaking.
Second, the Department of the Interior has demonstrated hostility to expanding
tribal membership, 130 and expanding tribal membership may alienate the
Department and make it harder to accomplish the tribe’s political goals. Third,
tribes have become much more effective politically in recent years, regardless of
their small numbers, by banding together in intertribal organizations. One tribe
greatly expanding its own membership may be seen as more of a political threat
by the other tribes, and would at least put more of a strain on the already
overburdened federal benefits system, which could lead to less intertribal cohesion
and less effective advocacy. Fourth, the federal government, with encouragement
from state governments, might see this as a transparently political move, rather
than a move based on tribal self-determination. Accordingly, the government may
begin to see tribes less as independent sovereign entities and more as political
clubs, not entitled to special recognition. This could invite another round of
termination. 131
Opening up membership could have other political benefits beyond purely
raising population numbers, however. As discussed earlier, tribes currently suffer
from a “democratic deficit” in the sense that non-Indians can never have political
voice in the tribe. 132 In addition to the legal benefits discussed earlier, a thoughtful
program of opening up enrollment could lead to an increase in perceived
democratic accountability, and the federal government might be more open to
increasing tribal jurisdiction as it did in the Violence Against Women Act
amendments of 2013. Further expansions of tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction
129
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and increased sovereignty over reservations would be more politically palatable.
The tribe would still have to be wary of several of the problems described above,
but focusing on internal political participation rather than external political influence
could alleviate some of the federal government’s potential concerns.
6. Distributing benefits
An important concern in designing membership rules is how membership
changes will affect the distribution of tribal benefits like social services and per
capita payments. In particular, Professor Goldberg notes that one hesitancy
current tribal members might have with extending membership is that many of the
current members or their ancestors endured hardships to remain with the tribe and
keep the tribe alive. 133 They may feel that whatever benefits they are receiving
now are their reward for staying with the tribe, while others left to seek
opportunities elsewhere or assimilate, and are now trying to return and claim the
benefits for themselves. 134 These are valid concerns, and there are no easy
answers. However, relying solely on blood quantum might miss the point and
include new arrivals with higher blood quantum while excluding some of those that
have always been there, or their children. Additionally, trying to block newcomers
from enrolling could lead to media or political problems. 135 This is an important
consideration, and one that will play an important role in the discussions of any
tribe that seeks to change its membership requirements.
7. Extending tribal jurisdiction
A common goal for tribes is to consolidate control over their reservations
and the people that live there, in order to better govern and ensure peace and
safety. Tribes should consider their goal when designing membership criteria, as
well-designed rules for enrollment can directly and indirectly increase tribal
jurisdiction. 136
8. Internal and external perception
Like other kinds of constitutional reform, changing or reevaluating existing
membership requirements can change the way tribal members think about the
133
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purpose of the tribe and their relationship to it. A fair process of reform that reflects
cultural values has the intrinsic value of increasing the legitimacy of the tribal
government in the eyes of its members. Undertaking the reforms to bring
membership criteria in line with traditional understandings could also give
members a sense that the tribe is more in control of its own destiny.
External perception is indirectly tied to the political influence discussion
above, but applies even more broadly. Perception of a tribe as being more or less
inclusive or more or less culturally cohesive can impact the way state and federal
governments, as well as non-Indians behave with regards to the tribe. There are
many misconceptions about tribes, and if tribes can seem like more legitimate
governments that deserve sovereignty, they will be more likely to make political
gains. Additionally, a greater respect for tribal sovereignty in a community might
encourage individual non-members to respect tribal laws and decisions, even
when the tribe lacks formal legal jurisdiction.
B. Alternative requirements for tribal enrollment
There are several common features in tribal citizenship rules, but they are
not the exclusive possibilities. Tribes can go beyond these or use various forms
and combinations of requirements in order to craft membership criteria that is
appropriate to the specific tribe. The common requirements this paper will analyze
include blood quantum, lineage requirements, and adoption procedures, as well as
birthplace requirements as part of a broader residency analysis. Another common
requirement is no dual citizenship, 137 which seems like a secondary factor that will
depend on the nature of the tribe and the tribe’s decision with regards to the other
criteria and its relationships with other tribes. In addition to these common
requirements, this section will look at cultural connection criteria. The next section
will look at potential solutions to some of the tensions that emerge in designing
membership criteria.
1. Blood Quantum
The advantages of a blood quantum requirement include the ease of
application and the rough approximation of tribal cultural connection. However, as
discussed above, blood quantum requirements emerged from unsettling federal
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policies. They might also lead to dangerously exclusionary ways of thinking about
membership, and risk extinguishing the tribe.
There are two common forms of blood quantum requirements: those based
on tribal ancestry and those based on Indian ancestry generally. 138 Blood quantum
is one of the simplest requirements to apply and does approximate the way
membership worked pre-contact (when everyone was 100% Indian). It also limits
membership to kin, and encourages people to marry and reproduce within the
tribe, both of which may in turn encourage greater cultural participation.
Additionally, people who have a higher percentage of Indian blood are more likely
to look Indian, which could lead to greater affinity with their tribe and Indians
generally. 139 These requirements are also well-established for many tribes, having
existed since at least 1934. There are a number of problems with using blood
quantum criteria, however. The historical use of blood quantum, and the way it
was incorporated by the federal government into tribal constitutions, makes its
application suspect. As Professor Goldberg notes, “tradition” is not static, so
discarding blood quantum solely for being “nontraditional” is somewhat antithetical
to the idea that tribes are living cultures. 140 However, the historical roots of blood
quantum are dangerous, and taint their contemporary application. 141 Just as blood
quantum was used to divide up resources for tribal members, the continued use of
blood quantum encourages tribal members to think of membership as a limited
resource, like money, rather than as a cultural and governmental entity. 142 Blood
quantum rules encourage selfish exclusion instead of forward thinking inclusion.
This is not true for all tribes, and those with a long historical tradition of defining
membership this way should not feel compelled to change. Those tribes that only
adopted these rules in 1934, however, should examine their culture and traditions
and see if blood quantum is consistent and necessary to their perception of tribal
138
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belonging. This is not to say that race can have no legitimate role in determining
membership, just that using it as the sole criterion often fails to capture elements
that are likely more important to long term tribal survival. Additionally, as
mentioned above, a strict blood quantum combined with high rates of
intermarriage between Indians and non-Indians could lead to the extinction of the
tribe.
2. Lineal Descent
Lineal descent rules also capture many of the benefits of blood quantum
requirements, such as kinship and ease of application, but risk weaker cultural
connections and the perception of the tribe solely as a financial resource. Like
blood quantum, there are multiple forms of lineal descent rules that tribes use
today. 143 Some tribes require enrollment of a single parent, some require a
specific parent to be enrolled, some require both parents to be enrolled, and some
just require the enrollment of an ancestor on a particular roll compiled by the
federal government. The latter category in particular is a very loose requirement
and employed by some of the largest tribes today. 144 As mentioned above, these
looser rules have led to greater external political clout for these tribes by
increasing membership. There will also be a lesser chance of the tribe eventually
running out of members through intermarriage, unless the rule is that both parents
must be members. A disadvantage of lineal descent is that it could lead to a
greater percentage of the population having weak ties to the reservation and the
tribe. Logically, the greater the geographic dispersion of tribal members, the
greater the likelihood that tribal laws and expenditures will reflect individual
interests rather than tribal interests. People living off the reservation will be more
inclined to vote for per capita distribution of funds than investment in tribal
infrastructure, for instance. Once again, this leads to a view of the tribe as a piggy
bank, which is almost certainly not conducive to the long term survival of the tribe.
Another problem is that descent rules alone fail to create any kind of necessary tie
to the tribe other than applying for and receiving membership. Under blood
quantum rules, members are encouraged to marry other members, and therefore
spend time near the reservation interacting with other tribal members. This
investment can encourage members to be more tribally minded. Under loose lineal
descent rules, however, there is no such incentive.
143
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A problem shared by blood quantum and lineal descent rules are the
negative reaction various outsiders have to race based rules for membership. The
Supreme Court’s race-blind equal protection jurisprudence, for instance,
demonstrates a level of hostility to differential treatment of groups based on
race. 145 Additionally, many people are concerned with special treatment of Indians,
and do not like that they receive special rights. 146 These considerations counsel
against the use of race as the sole criteria for tribal membership.
3. Residency
Using residency on or near the tribal land as a membership requirement
helps ensure a cultural connection, as well as encouraging members to think
about the reservation as a whole rather than focusing on their separate individual
desires. Even if members are voting entirely in self-interest, if they live on the
reservation it is more likely to be in their interest to choose investment in
infrastructure over per capita distribution of funds. There are shortcomings to a
strict residency requirement, however. As Professor Goldberg notes, residency
requirements could prevent people from leaving for legitimate tribal reasons,
especially if they would lose membership or rights while absent from the
reservation. 147 In addition, tribal governments as landowners have the power to
control who resides on the reservation, 148 which could lead to exclusions of certain
people based on illegitimate political reasons. Additionally, people who live just
outside of the reservation might be just as interested in cultural affairs as those on
the reservation, but would be excluded by a rule that requires residency within the
reservation boundaries. These concerns could be dealt with by carefully
constructed rules based on the individual circumstances of each tribe, but the linedrawing issues they present may make strict residency requirements untenable,
as people might be unable to agree on how to implement them.
Birthplace requirements are a subset of residency requirements. Like other
residency requirements, they attempt to capture the value of having people remain
145
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near the reservation. Instead of being aimed at the individual member, however,
they are aimed at the parents, who will be incentivized to live near the reservation,
or at least go to the reservation for the child’s birth. If the requirement is that the
parents be domiciled on the reservation, there is the potential advantage that the
child will be more likely to be raised on the reservation and with the tribal culture,
but there is also no guarantee that the child will maintain that connection later in
life.
4. Adoption
Several tribes have adoption or naturalization procedures for non-members
to become members of the tribe, but the requirements for adoption vary from tribe
to tribe. Professor Goldberg lists several varieties of requirements. 149 Some tribes
seem to have no Indian blood requirement, at least in the constitution, 150 while
others do. 151 Some tribes also have additional requirements in order to be
adopted, such as residency 152 or spousal connection. 153 Adoption procedures
have the advantage of being flexible and taking the most information into account,
but a reliance solely on adoption proceedings to fix other errors in the system is
unwise. These proceedings will likely have a great deal of discretion built in, 154
which could be abused to exclude personal or political enemies of the person or
persons in charge of deciding adoptions. If appeals of adoption decisions are used
to combat these potential errors, it could greatly increase the burden on tribal
courts or administrative bodies.
5. Cultural connection
Complications in measuring and evaluating “cultural connection” could
make it difficult to agree on a standard for determining membership. Residency,
discussed above, is often used as a kind of proxy for cultural connection, but there
are other ways of testing an individual’s ties to the community. Other factors
149
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include: language fluency, community service, elders’ certification, and ceremonial
participation. 155 There could also be a civics test, ala the United States
naturalization process, 156 which could test familiarity with tribal culture, history, and
laws. Any combination of these factors could be used, based on the circumstances
of the tribe, and it could take the form of a test or cultural knowledge, or a checklist
of requirements, or both. Using cultural criteria has the benefits of ensuring the
tribal members are knowledgeable about the tribe, and the investment of learning
about the tribe could inspire them to be more civic minded. Additionally, it has the
obvious advantage of helping to preserve tribal culture and language against
external influences. However, there are a number of potential issues with using
cultural affiliation as the test for citizenship.
Like adoption, the question of who will administer a cultural test and the
possible appeals process for that test are difficult to resolve, and a tribe wishing to
implement a test will have to consider administrative costs against the costs of
wrongfully excluding people from the tribe. Furthermore, designing these tests
could be controversial, as culture and tradition are not static, and different tribal
members might have different ideas about what it means to be a member of a
given tribe. These are not insurmountable obstacles, but they may delay or disrupt
the process of membership reform.
One issue that Professor Goldberg notes is that the criteria that could be
used as proxies for cultural connection, e.g. residency, language fluency, are
“unnervingly” similar to the criteria set forth in the controversial “existing Indian
family” test some courts have used in applying the Indian Child Welfare Act. 157
Courts applying the “existing Indian family” test look at various factors to determine
whether a child is “Indian enough” to trigger ICWA provisions, contrary to the
language of the statute and congressional intent. 158 The test is applied in a
substantial minority of states, and the Supreme Court avoided ruling on the
doctrine in its recent ICWA case. 159 “Existing Indian family” doctrine devalues the
155
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opinion of the tribe as to the Indian status of the child, and usurps tribal and
federal authority for state authority. Hesitancy to employ a test that resembles the
“existing Indian family” test is therefore understandable. However, as Professor
Goldberg notes, “what seems presumptuous when undertaken by state courts may
be less troubling when the deciding authority is a tribal enrollment board.” 160
Additionally, developing their own culturally tailored requirements would allow
tribes to set authoritative criteria for their own tribes, rather than leaving it to state
courts to decide. Lack of federal action 161 means that many states will continue to
employ the doctrine and tribes having clearly developed their own criteria may
encourage state courts to defer to tribal judgments based on those criteria.
Perhaps more importantly, even if the requirements are not ultimately used for
enrollment purposes, the development of culturally-based criteria could help in
these cases, and could help a tribe define its cultural goals.
Deciding who would be allowed to prove their cultural connection is another
potential difficulty, as some tribes might be inundated with potential members
trying to get a share of the gaming revenues. 162 Professor Goldberg also notes
that applying an expedited version of the test to those with family ties, or giving
them special treatment on the test, would bring race back into the equation, which
some scholars oppose. 163 These challenges seem to counsel more for adopting
thoughtful, nuanced rules, rather than for rejecting cultural connection criteria
completely. Requiring recommendations from elders, or residency, for instance,
would prevent a large number of false applicants, as would a system that delays or
denies per capita payments to members who join this way, which will be discussed
more later in this paper. Additionally, while some critics might oppose the use of
race at all in determining tribal membership, giving preferential treatment to
biological Indians would make sense, as they would be presumptively more likely
to have cultural affiliation that might not be captured by whatever cultural
connection test is employed. Giving preference to those with tribal blood while
keeping some form of membership open to a broader population would seem to
capture many of the legal benefits discussed in Section II.
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Another problem discussed by Professor Goldberg is the possibility of
disenrollments based on lack of cultural connection, or lack of such connection for
a period of time, or a generational gap. 164 Furthermore, some tribes believe that
one cannot lose connection to their tribe, because they are born with it and that
connection stays with them even after death. 165 Both of these concerns are better
left to the tribes on an individual basis, and do not counsel against tribes adopting
cultural criteria based on their own traditions. To reiterate, the paramount concern
in defining membership criteria for tribes is the tradition and culture of the
individual tribe. Each tribe must arrive at its own decisions about what it means to
be a member. Ultimately, incorporating some sort of cultural connection test is a
good strategy for tribes to help maintain cultural survival, and encourage more
participation in cultural activities.
C. Solutions to Design Problems
In order to resolve some of the tensions that were discussed above, tribes
can combine existing requirements, or create new criteria that balances traditional
goals with modern circumstances. There are several potential solutions including:
separate voting districts for off-reservation and on-reservation members, a “rightof-return” for off-reservation individuals, and severing benefits from tribal
enrollment. 166 Professor Goldberg mentions that some of the criteria might have
the effect of creating “multiple categories of citizenship,” 167 which as a general
principle merits further discussion. Professor Goldberg also mentions expanding
adoption procedures, 168 which is discussed above.
1. Separate voting rights for off-reservation and on-reservation
members
Separate voting districts can allow non-residents of the reservation to
maintain their connection with the tribe, while keeping most of the tribal control in
the hands of reservation residents. An example is a recent Cherokee constitutional
convention, where the draft constitution has now been adopted as the Cherokee
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Constitution. 169 Under the Cherokee Constitution, 15 of the 17 legislative seats are
apportioned for Cherokees residing in Oklahoma, while the remaining two seats
are elected by non-residents, 170 who comprise about 40% of the Cherokee
population. 171 This measure helps ensure that the legislature is focused internally
on developing the tribe and its infrastructure, while giving a voice to the nonresident Cherokee and helping maintain their connection to the tribe. This is an
elegant solution for the Cherokee, but it may not work for all tribes. For some, nonresident members may feel that their voices are just as important as those on the
reservation, and they should not be allocated such a small proportion of the votes.
At the same time, residents may feel that only those who are willing to maintain
close ties to the tribe should be allowed to participate in tribal government.
Additionally, this approach fails to capture the benefits of residency requirements
that strongly incentivize interaction with the tribe and the potential that has for
investment in tribal culture and development. However, it is probably better than
no residency requirement in terms of cultural preservation, and provides a degree
of flexibility for tribal members who might leave for legitimate reasons. Tribes that
are interested in this kind of tier voting system should also consider how much
weight to give non-resident voters for referendums, or constitutional amendments
that require popular vote.
2. “Right-of-return”
Under a reactivation system, it seems like those living off the reservation
would lose their normal citizenship in the tribe, but retain the right to reactive it
easily when they returned, and if they met certain criteria. 172 Like off-reservation
voting, this might help maintain ties to the tribe, although it could lead to confusion
and alienate people who leave the reservation for college. It seems like a better
solution might be to consider them members in most regards but remove or restrict
their ability to vote.
3. Severing benefits from tribal enrollment
Separating tribal enrollment from the automatic receipt of benefits can help
ensure that members choose to identify with the tribe for more legitimate purposes
than monetary reward, and encourage a focus on tribal development and
169
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investment. Professor Goldberg discusses a system where tribal enrollment is not
necessary to receive tribal benefits. Core tribal decisions can be made by those
with the strongest cultural connection, while a broader class can receive benefits,
i.e. the children of tribal members who do not qualify for membership. 173 Goldberg
notes however, that this might only extend to tribal benefits, and that the federal
government might not provide services to those who are not members of the
tribe. 174 One solution Goldberg suggests is to call everyone tribal members, but
only allow some to vote. 175 This could have a negative effect, however, if the
federal government decides it only wants to provide services to traditional tribal
members, it might stop deferring to tribal definitions of membership and adopt
criteria to decide who is Indian enough to receive benefits. Government
intervention is a potential threat with any system that divides up rights based on
tiered citizenship, but it is particularly acute when benefits are being provided
without the right to vote, as it might be seen as an attempt to game the federal
system.
Another possibility is the inverse system, where certain members are
allowed to vote but not partake in certain benefits. Some tribes already have a
form of this, such as the Colville Confederated Tribes, which allows only
descendants of certain constituent tribes to hunt or fish in certain areas. 176 It could
be hard to maintain an inverse system, since the voters might just vote to include
themselves as beneficiaries, but incorporating the requirement into the
constitution, or requiring a 2/3 vote or some similar provision, could possibly
alleviate this problem, depending on tribal demographics. Expanding voting rights
has several potential advantages. If voting was universal but per capita payments
were conditioned on tribal residency, for example, non-reservation voters would
have no personal incentive to vote for per capita payments, and on reservation
votes would have to choose between two options that both benefit them. This
would make tribes more likely to invest in important infrastructure, while keeping
the decision somewhat democratic and legitimate. Another possibility would be to
limit per capita payments to members with sufficient blood quantum, while
extending voting rights to others who joined through a cultural test. This would
discourage people from attempting to join a tribe just to receive monetary
173
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payments, which is a concern when loosening membership requirements. 177 Since
voting membership would still be open to non-Indians, however, this scheme
would solve the “democratic deficit” problem and allow tribes to exercise greater
jurisdiction, even over those who choose not to become members. Finally, this
type of system would attract non-members with an actual interest in the tribal
cultural and governance, and allow those who have maintained certain ties but
insufficient blood quantum to maintain their tribal identity.
4. Tier levels of citizenship
The examples discussed above each involve giving different membership
rights to different individuals, based on a variety of factors. Thinking about
membership and tribal enrollment in terms of degrees of rights, as opposed to an
on/off switch where an individual is either in or out, can lead to much more
nuanced citizenship laws that capture many of the benefits with fewer of the costs.
The two main disadvantages of a tiered system are the possibility that the federal
government might decide to limit federal benefits to members that fit certain
criteria, and that the system might end up being overly complex. If the membership
system is too complicated it could seem overly legalistic and lose its cultural
character, and members might start to think of themselves as belonging to a
category of beneficiaries, rather than as members of a tribe. As long as tribes are
conscious of this potential problem, however, they should be able to avoid it, by
tying and framing the requirements to the traditions and goals of the tribe.
Some tribes already have different levels of membership rights that vary
according to different membership criteria. The Choctaw Tribe of Oklahoma, for
instance, allows voting by all lineal descendants of people who were on the Dawes
Rolls, but only allows members with at least ¼ blood quantum to hold the positions
of Chief, Assistant Chief, or Tribal Council Member. 178 Residency is also a
common requirement for holding office, although this is more often thought of in
terms of geographic representation rather than as an indication that the candidate
will be more culturally connected. 179
These establish precedent for tiered levels of membership rights, according
to proxies for cultural affiliation. The same theory could be extended to benefits,
177
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such as per capita payments, which should ease some of the concerns with
expanding tribal membership. Federal Regulations require that tribes seeking to
distribute per capita payments to a subset of the population must justify their
decision and show that it is “reasonable and not arbitrary” and that it does not
violate the Indian Civil Rights Act. 180 The Indian Civil Rights Act contains a
guarantee of equal protection, like the 14th Amendment, 181 which means that the
tribe might have to justify its action according to a similar standard, i.e. the strict
scrutiny standard that is normally applied to race-based classifications. 182
However, there are several answers to the protection concern. First, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) has generally left enforcement of ICRA provisions to tribal
courts, rather than getting directly involved, 183 which is in-line with congressional
policy as explained in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 184 Accordingly, the BIA
might be willing to defer to tribal judgments regarding the validity of such a plan,
particularly since it is tied to tribal membership determinations which are firmly in
the realm of the tribe’s sovereignty. 185 Second, blood quantum has been used to
draw lines in federal and tribal law for a long time, and might be treated as a
special case that does not trigger strict scrutiny analysis. 186 Third, even if the
determination is subject to strict scrutiny, it does serve a compelling government
interest, as discussed above, and the potential infeasibility of finding other ways to
deter newcomers who are only interested in per capita payments might mean that
the classification is sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny.
Essentially, if full strict scrutiny is applied, the burden would be on the tribe to
demonstrate that “available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice,” 187
which is generally a very high bar, but not necessarily insurmountable.
CONCLUSION
This paper had three goals. The first was to explore what legal road-blocks,
if any, would prevent tribes from enrolling non-Indians as members. It appears that
tribes would have the power to begin enrolling non-Indians, without any further
action needed from Congress. The second was to highlight and begin a
180
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conversation about some of the legal implications of expanding tribal membership
criteria. In particular, the potential that expanded criteria would have for bringing
tribes closer to a pre-Oliphant level of tribal criminal jurisdiction. The final goal was
to expand on the discussion of the policy implications that tribal membership
decisions would have for tribes, and look at ways to reconcile competing
objectives. By combining different membership requirements, and tying certain
benefits and rights to certain criteria, tribes can achieve a more flexible, nuanced
approach to tribal membership that more closely reflects the goals of the specific
tribe. As discussed above, tribes that seek to redefine their membership rules
must focus on their own culture and traditions. However, there are many legal and
political consequences that would emerge from changing enrollment criteria,
thoughtful constitutional reform should take those implications into account.
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